It is not clear what a system for evidence-based common knowledge should look like if common knowledge is treated as a greatest fixed point. This paper is a preliminary step towards such a system. We argue that the standard induction rule is not well suited to axiomatize evidence-based common knowledge. As an alternative, we study two different deductive systems for the logic of common knowledge. The first system makes use of an induction axiom whereas the second one is based on co-inductive proof theory. We show the soundness and completeness for both systems.
Introduction
Justification logics [6] are epistemic logics that explicitly include justifications for an agent's knowledge. Historically, Artemov [3, 4] developed the first of these logics, the Logic of Proofs, to solve the problem of a provability semantics for S4. Fitting's model construction [11] provides a natural epistemic semantics for the Logic of Proofs, which can be generalized to the whole family of justification logics. It augments Kripke models with a function that specifies admissible evidence for each formula at a given state.
Instead of the simple A is known, justification logics formalize t is a justification for A. Thus, these logics feature evidence-based knowledge and enable us to reason about the evidence. This novel approach has many applications. For instance, it makes it possible to tackle the logical omniscience problem [7] and to deal with certain forms of self-referentiality [12] .
The notion of common knowledge is essential in the area of multi-agent systems, where coordination among a set of agents is a central issue. The textbooks [10, 14] provide excellent introductions to epistemic logics in general and common knowledge in particular. Informally, common knowledge of a proposition A is defined as
Preliminaries

Language and Semantics
We consider a language with h agents for some h > 0. This language will be fixed throughout the paper, and h will always denote the number of agents. Propositions P and their negations P are atoms. Formulae are denoted by A, B, C. They are given by the following grammar
where 1 ≤ i ≤ h. The formula 2 i A is read as agent i knows A, and the formula CA is read as A is common knowledge. The connectives 2 i and C have 3 i andC as their respective duals. The negation ¬A of a formula A is defined in the usual way by using De Morgan's laws, the law of double negation, and the duality laws for modal operators. We also define A → B := ¬A ∨ B and A ↔ B := (A → B) ∧ (B → A). The formula EA is an abbreviation for everybody knows A:
A Kripke structure M is a tuple (S, R 1 , . . . , R h , π), where S is a non-empty set of states, each R i is a binary relation on S, and π is a valuation function that assigns to each atomic formula a set of states such that π P = S \ π(P ).
Given a Kripke structure M = (S, R 1 . . . , R h , π) and states v, w ∈ S, we say that w is reachable from v in n steps (reach(v, w, n)) if there exist states s 0 , . . . , s n such that s 0 = v, s n = w, and for all 0 ≤ j ≤ n−1 there exists 1 ≤ i ≤ h with R i (s j , s j+1 ). We say w is reachable from v if there exists an n with reach(v, w, n).
Let M = (S, R 1 . . . , R h , π) be a Kripke structure and v ∈ S be a state. We define the satisfaction relation M, v |= A inductively on the structure of the formula A:
Kripke structure M and some state v.
Deductive System
Let us briefly recall the definition of the system for common knowledge that makes use of the induction rule. Modal axioms: For all formulae A and B and all indices 1 ≤ i ≤ h,
Necessitation rule: For all formulae A and all indices 1 ≤ i ≤ h,
Co-closure axiom: For all formulae A,
Induction rule: For all formulae A and B,
We have the following standard result, see [10] . 3 The Inductive Way
We now introduce a deductive system for common knowledge where the induction rule is replaced by an induction axiom. To obtain a complete system, we also need to include a normality axiom and a necessitation rule for the common knowledge operator.
Definition 3.1 [The system H Ax ] The Hilbert calculus H Ax consists of the axioms and rules of H R whereby (I-R1) is replaced by the following axioms and rule:
C-modal axiom: For all formulae A and B,
Induction axiom: For all formulae A,
In [14] , an induction axiom is introduced as A ∧ C(A → EA) → CA. However, in our setting, the axiom from [14] would not be sound since we do not define common knowledge to be reflexive.
Soundness
The soundness of H Ax is easily obtained. 
Completeness
In order to establish the completeness of H Ax , we have to introduce an intermediate system H int . We first reduce H R to H int and then reduce H int to H Ax . These reductions reveal the proof-theoretic relationship between the induction axiom and the induction rule. Moreover, it follows that the completeness of H R implies the completeness of H Ax . Proof. It is sufficient to show that (I-R1) is derivable in H int . Assume
Then
. By (I-R2), we obtain that
. Proof. We first show that (C-Dis) is derivable in H Ax . The following formula is an instance of (C-K):
The last two statements together imply that
Thus, the derivability of (I-R2) follows from (I-Ax).
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The two lemmas, together with the completeness of H R , give us the completeness of H Ax . 
The Co-Inductive Way
Deductive System
We now introduce the infinitary system S for common knowledge. In this formal system, proofs are finitely branching trees that may have infinitely long branches while all finite branches must still end in an axiom. In order to obtain a sound deductive system, we have to impose a global constraint on such infinite branches. Roughly, we require that on every infinite branch in a proof, there be a greatest fixed point unfolded infinitely often.
We consider sequents to be finite sets of formulae and denote them by Γ, ∆, Σ. For a sequent ∆ = {A 1 , . . . , A n }, we denote the sequent
Definition 4.1 A preproof for a sequent Γ is a possibly infinite tree whose root is labeled with Γ and which is built according to the following axioms and rules:
Axioms: For all sequents Γ and all propositions P , Γ, P, P (ax)
Propositional rules: For all sequents Γ and all formulae A and B,
Modal rules: For all sequents Γ and Σ, all formulae A, and all indices 1 ≤ i ≤ h,
Fixed point rules: For all sequents Γ and all formulae A,
We now introduce the notion of a thread in a branch of a proof tree.
Definition 4.2
The principal formula of a rule is the formula that is explicitly displayed in the conclusion of the rule. The active formulae of a rule are those formulae that are explicitly displayed in the premise(s) of the rule. The formulae in Γ and Σ are called the side formulae of a rule.
Definition 4.3 Consider a proof tree for some sequent. For all rule applications r that occur in this proof tree, we define a connection relation Con(r) on formulae as follows:
(i) In the case when r is not an application of (2), we define (A, B) ∈ Con(r) if A = B and A is a side formula of r or if A is the principal formula and B is an active formula of r.
(ii) In the case when r is an application of (2), we define (2 i A, A) ∈ Con(r) if 2 i A is the principal formula of r and we define (3 i B, B) ∈ Con(r) if 3 i B ∈ 3 i Γ.
Definition 4.4 Consider a finite or infinite branch Γ 0 , Γ 1 , . . . in a proof tree. Let r i be the rule application where Γ i is the conclusion and Γ i+1 is a premise. A thread in this branch is a sequence of formulae A 0 , A 1 , . . . such that (A i , A i+1 ) ∈ Con(r i ) and A i ∈ Γ i for every i. Note that a thread in an infinite branch may be finite or infinite.
Definition 4.5 Consider an infinite branch of a preproof for a sequent Γ. An infinite thread in this branch is called a C-thread if infinitely many of its formulae are the principal formulae of applications of (C).
Definition 4.6 An S-proof for a sequent Γ is a preproof for Γ such that every finite branch ends in an axiom and every infinite branch contains a C-thread. We write S Γ if there exists an S-proof for Γ.
We will illustrate how S-proofs work by deriving the induction axiom in S. In order to present this derivation in a compact form, we need to state some properties of the system. It should be noted that the proof of Lemma 4.7(ii) requires infinite derivations, e.g., in the case of A = CB. 
(ii) For all formulae A and all sequents Γ, the following generalized form of axioms (ax) is derivable:
Example 4.8 Fig. 1 contains the bottom part of an infinite S-proof for the induction axiom (I-Ax) expressed in a sequent form asẼ¬A,C(A ∧Ẽ¬A), CA. Two of the three topmost sequents shown are labeled (ax') and are derivable by Lemma 4.7(ii). The only infinite branch outside of (ax')-derivations has infinitely many repetitions of the sequent ¬A,Ẽ¬A,C(A ∧Ẽ¬A), CA. To show that this preproof is indeed an S-proof, it is sufficient to find a C-thread in this branch. The thread that consists of the red underlined formulae is such a C-thread.
Soundness
The soundness proof essentially uses the idea that underlies the fundamental semantic theorem of the modal µ-calculus. Let δ(A) be the maximal number of nested C operators in the formula A: for instance, δ(C(CP ∨ CQ)) = 2. Given m ≥ 1 and a sequence σ = (σ m , . . . , σ 1 ) of ordinals, for all formulae A such that δ(A) ≤ m, we define the satisfaction relation |= σ C in the same way as |= except in the case of C, where we set M, v |= σ C CB if M, w |= σ C B for all w for which there exists n with σ δ(CB) ≥ n ≥ 1 and reach(v, w, n). We immediately obtain
It is sufficient to consider only ordinals ≤ ω, but ω itself as a possible element of a sequence σ is necessary to guarantee that for all formulae A,
Lemma 4.9 Let A be a formula, ∆ be a sequent, σ be a sequence of ordinals, M = (S, R 1 , . . . , R h , π) be a Kripke structure, v ∈ S be a state, and
Given two sequences σ and τ of the same length m, we say σ < τ if σ is smaller than τ with respect to the lexicographic ordering. Since we consider sequences of a fixed length, the relation < is a well-ordering. Proof. Suppose A is not valid yet there is an S-proof T for it. Then there is a Kripke structure M and a state s such that M, s |= A, which will be used to construct a branch Γ 0 , Γ 1 , . . . with the corresponding inferences r 0 , r 1 , . . . in T and a sequence s 0 , s 1 , . . . of states in M such that (a) M, s i |= Γ i and (b) if (B, C) ∈ Con(r i ), C ∈ Γ i+1 , and M, s i |= σ C B, then M, s i+1 |= σ C C. Let Γ 0 := A and s 0 := s. If Γ i and s i are given, we construct Γ i+1 and s i+1 according to the different cases for r i . Note that because of (a) Γ i cannot be axiomatic and thus must have been inferred by some rule.
(i) r i = (2): Let 2 i B ∈ Γ i be the principal formula of r i . Let σ be the least sequence such that M, s i |= σ C 2 i B. We apply Lemma 4.9 for this σ to find a state s i+1 such that (a) and (b) hold. We let Γ i+1 be the unique premise of r i .
(ii) r i = (∧): Let B 1 ∧ B 2 ∈ Γ i be the principal formula of r i . Let σ be the least sequence such that M, s i |= σ C B 1 ∧ B 2 . Let Γ i+1 be the j-th premise of r i such that M, s i |= σ C B j . Further, set s i+1 := s i . This construction guarantees (a) and (b).
(iii) In all other cases, r i has a unique premise ∆. We set s i+1 := s i and Γ i+1 := ∆.
Again (a) and (b) hold.
We have constructed an infinite branch in T . Since T is an S-proof, this branch must contain a C-thread A 0 , A 1 , . . . . For each natural number j, we define σ j to be the least sequence such that M, s j |= σ j C A j . Note that σ j exists by (4). It follows from (b) that σ j+1 ≤ σ j for all j. Moreover, because we consider a C-thread, there are infinitely many applications of (C), which, according to (3), means that there are infinitely many j's with σ j+1 < σ j . This contradicts the well-foundedness of <. 2
Completeness
The completeness proof for the infinitary system S is based on [15] , where a similar result is shown for the modal µ-calculus. For a given formula A, we define an infinite game such that player I has a winning strategy if and only if there is an S-proof for A and player II has a winning strategy if and only if there is a countermodel for A. It is possible to show that this game is determined, i.e., one of the players has a winning strategy. Hence, the completeness of S follows. Definition 4.11 A sequent Γ is saturated if all of the following conditions hold:
(ii) if A ∨ B ∈ Γ, then A ∈ Γ and B ∈ Γ, (iii) if CA ∈ Γ, then EA ∧ ECA ∈ Γ, and (iv) ifCA ∈ Γ, thenẼA ∨ẼCA ∈ Γ.
Definition 4.12 The system S Game consists of the rules of S whereby (2) is replaced by the following rules: Alternative modal rules: Let 1 ≤ m ≤ h, H = {h 1 , . . . , h m } ⊆ {1, . . . , h}, and n h 1 , . . . , n hm be positive integers. For all saturated sequents Σ that contain neither formulae that start with 3 j , j ∈ H, nor formulae that start with 2 i , 1 ≤ i ≤ h, all sequents Γ j , j ∈ H, and all formulae A j,1 , . . . , A j,n j , j ∈ H,
Note that this rule has n h 1 + · · · + n hm many premises.
An S Game -tree for a sequent Γ is built by iterating the following two steps until one reaches a saturated sequent which is either axiomatic or to which (2 ) cannot be applied:
(i) Apply the rules (∨), (∧), (C), and (C) backwards until a saturated sequent is reached. While applying the rules, make sure that the conclusion always remains a subset of the premise.
(ii) Apply (2 ) backwards, if possible.
We now introduce a system S Dis for establishing unprovability. Accordingly, its rules should not be read as sound, i.e., preserving validity, but rather as "dis-sound," i.e., preserving invalidity. 
An S Dis -tree is built in the same way as an S Game -tree except that (∧1) and (∧2) are used instead of (∧). Therefore, an S Dis -tree for a sequent Γ is not unique. The notions of a thread and a C-thread are extended to S Game -and S Dis -trees. Ã C-thread is a thread that contains infinitely many principal formulae of applications of (C). Note that any infinite thread is either a C-or aC-thread but not both.
Definition 4.14 We say that an S Dis -tree T for a sequent Γ disproves Γ if (i) no branch ends with an axiom and (ii) any infinite thread in any branch is aC-thread.
Example 4.15
In order to disproveCP →CCP , we construct an S Dis -tree T for a corresponding sequent CP,CCP (see Fig. 2 ). In this tree, 3 1 CP, 3 1C CP, 2 1 P, Σ is a saturation of the sequent CP, EP ∧ ECP, EP,CCP,ẼCP ∨ẼCCP,ẼCP,ẼCCP .
The saturation process is abbreviated as ( * ). It involves exactly 2h − 2 applications of (∨) to saturate the disjunctionsẼCP andẼCCP . In addition, the conjunction EP is saturated by at most h−1 applications of (∧1) and (∧2) in such a way that 2 1 P is the only resulting formula that starts with 2 i . Most formulae that result from this saturation are disjunctions, conjunctions, or are already present in (5), with the exception of 3 1 CP, . . . , 3 h CP, 3 1C CP, . . . , 3 hC CP, and 2 1 P . Thus, Σ contains neither formulae that start with 2 i nor formulae that start with 3 1 , which enables us to apply (2 ) . The tree T extends upward indefinitely with infinitely many repetitions of the sequent CP,CCP, P . This tree has only one branch, which is infinite. And this branch contains only one infinite thread, the one that consists of the red underlined formulae in Fig. 2 . And this thread is indeed aC-thread. It may seem that this branch also contains a C-thread because there are infinitely many applications of (C) in the branch. However, the principal formulae of these (C)-rules do not belong to one thread. In particular, the thread that starts from CP in the root sequent does not pass through CP in the premise of the (2 )-rule shown in Fig. 2 . Instead, this thread passes through EP ∧ ECP , EP , . . . , 2 1 P , and P and eventually disappears after the next application of (2 ). Now we are going to show that any sequent Γ has either an S-tree that proves it or an S Dis -tree that disproves it.
Let T be an S Game -tree for Γ. We define an infinite game for two players on T . Intuitively, player I will try to show that Γ is provable while player II will try to show the opposite. The game is played as follows:
(i) the game starts at the root of T ,
(ii) at any (2 ) node, player I chooses one of the children, (iii) at any (∧) node, player II chooses one of the children, (iv) at all other non-leaf nodes, the only child is chosen by default.
Such a game results in a path in T . In the case of a finite path, player I wins if the path ends in an axiom; otherwise, player II wins. In the case of an infinite path, player I wins if the path contains a C-thread; otherwise, player II wins. (ii) There is a winning strategy for player II if and only if there is an S Dis -disproof for Γ contained in T .
Proof. For the first claim, if there is an S-proof for Γ contained in T , then the winning strategy for player I is to stay in the nodes that belong to this proof. For the other direction, consider a winning strategy for player I. It induces an S-proof for Γ as follows: the root of T is the root of the proof; if a node is included in the proof and player I has to perform the next move, then we select the child prescribed by the winning strategy; if it is player II's move, then we include all the children in our proof. The proof of the second claim is similar. 2
With the help of Martin's theorem [13] we can show that this game is determined, i.e., one of the players has a winning strategy. For details of this argument, see [9, 15] . We obtain the following as a corollary:
Theorem 4.17 Let T be an S Game -tree for Γ. Then there exists either an S-proof for Γ in T or an S Dis -disproof for Γ in T .
It remains to show that from a given S Dis -disproof for Γ, we can construct a countermodel for Γ.
Definition 4.18
Consider an S Dis -tree T that disproves a sequent Γ. The Kripke structure M T = (S T , R T 1 , . . . , R T h , π T ) induced by T is defined as follows: (i) S T consists of all occurrences of sequents in the conclusions of applications of (2 ) in T as well as of all occurrences of sequents in the leaves of T , (ii) R T i (Γ, ∆) holds if there is exactly one application of (2 ) in between Γ and ∆ and if there is a thread through Γ and ∆ that contains 2 i A ∈ Γ and A ∈ ∆ for some formula A, (iii) π T (P ) := {Γ ∈ S T : P / ∈ Γ}.
We can assign to each sequent ∆ in T the corresponding state in S T simply by finding the closest saturated descendant. We will denote this state by sat(∆).
. . . Fig. 3 . The Kripke structure M T induced by the S Dis -tree T from Example 4.15.
Example 4.19
The S Dis -tree T constructed in Example 4.15 forCP →CCP induces a Kripke structure M T shown in Fig. 3 . It is easy to see that
Lemma 4.20 states that this is a general phenomenon: the root of the Kripke structure induced by a given S Dis -tree falsifies the sequent at the root of the tree.
We defineδ(A) to be the maximal number of nestedC operators in A. Proof. Suppose that M T , sat(Γ) |= A. Then we can construct a C-thread in some branch of T , which contradicts the assumption that T disproves A. We will simultaneously construct a branch Γ 1 , Γ 2 , . . . and a thread A 1 , A 2 , . . . in it such that
We start with Γ 1 := Γ and A 1 := A. Now assume that we have constructed the thread up to some element A n ∈ Γ n with M T , sat(Γ n ) |= A n . The next element is selected as follows:
(i) If a rule different from (2 ) has been applied, then there is only one child of Γ n and we let Γ n+1 be that child. We have sat(Γ n ) = sat(Γ n+1 ) and distinguish the following cases: (a) A n is not the principal formula. We set A n+1 := A n . (b) A n = B ∨ C is the principal formula. We set
otherwise, we set A n+1 := C.
(c) A n = B ∧C is the principal formula. We set A n+1 := B if B occurs in Γ n+1 ; otherwise, we set A n+1 := C. (d) A n = CB is the principal formula. Let A n+1 := EB ∧ ECB. (e) A n =CB is the principal formula. Let A n+1 :=ẼB ∨ẼCB.
(ii) If (2 ) has been applied, then we have sat(Γ n ) = Γ n . We distinguish the following cases:
There is a child where B is the active formula. Let Γ n+1 be that child and set A n+1 := B. (b) A n = 3 i B. Because of M T , sat(Γ n ) |= A n , there exists a state t such that R T i (sat(Γ n ), t) and sigC(B, t) = sigC(3 i B, sat(Γ n )). The definition of M T implies that there is a child Γ of Γ n with sat(Γ ) = t. We set Γ n+1 := Γ and A n+1 := B. (c) A n is not of the form 2 i B or 3 i B. Then there exists A n ∈ Γ n that is of this form such that M T , Γ n |= A n . We drop the thread constructed so far and continue instead with the thread from A to A n .
If the constructed thread were finite, then the last element Γ n of the path would necessarily be a saturated sequent which would not contain formulae of the form 2 i B.
Then the definition of M T would imply that M T , Γ n |= A n , which would contradict (6) . Hence, the constructed thread is infinite. We can now use an argument about signatures similar to the one used in the soundness proof for S to show that the constructed thread cannot be aC-thread. This contradicts the assumption that T disproves Γ. 2 Proof. Let A be a formula that is not provable in S. By Theorem 4.17, there exists an S Dis -tree that disproves A. Thus, by Lemma 4.20, there exists a countermodel for A. Hence, A is not valid. 2
Conclusions
We have presented two systems H Ax and S for common knowledge, which could be used to construct a justification counterpart for common knowledge. It appears that H Ax is more suitable for this task than H R as the latter has an additional rule, (I-R1), which may make it difficult to prove constructive necessitation, a property essential for justification logics. However, to establish a connection between the modal logic of common knowledge and its justification counterpart, the so-called Realization Theorem, a cut-free sequent calculus (akin to S) for the modal logic is ordinarily required. Furthermore, the system S might give us more insight into the nature of common knowledge evidence terms. The idea of treating common knowledge evidence terms as co-inductive structures seems conceptually appealing but requires further investigation into the relationship between H Ax and S. In particular, syntactic cut-elimination is vital for embedding H Ax into S, which could shed a new light on how common knowledge emerges.
